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Asylum, Immigration and the Circulation of Unease at Lunar House 
 
As the global war on terror continues to be waged, the associated rise in fear, suspicion 
and mistrust has far reaching implications for minority populations in the UK. Individuals 
and groups who are seen and identified as different have begun to experience a 
disproportionate impact of the heightened security concerns. For example, the number of 
Asians stopped and searched in the UK rose by 75% between 2000 and 2004, compared 
to a 66% increase among blacks and only a 4% increase among whites1. Such impacts 
have coincided with more comprehensive police powers under the Terrorism Act (2000) 
according to which, although 'Officers must take particular care not to discriminate 
against members of minority ethnic groups … there may be circumstances … where it is 
appropriate for officers to take account of a person's ethnic origin in selecting persons to 
be stopped in response to a specific terrorist threat’2. While this so-called ‘ethnic 
profiling’ of police activities appears to have little practical benefit (13 per cent of stops 
and searches under normal police powers result in an arrest compared to just 1.7% of 
stops and searches on suspicion of terrorism3) the statistics reveal the racialised 
implications of the war on terror4. 
 
As part of the singling out of minority groups, asylum seekers constitute a category that is 
viewed with particular suspicion and hostility in the UK. Despite increasing concern 
about ‘home grown’ terrorism and the internal threat to national security, almost a quarter 
of all those arrested under anti-terrorism legislation between 2001 and 2005 (232 out of 
963 people, or 24%) had previously applied for asylum5. Given that the asylum seeking 
community in the UK constitutes less than 0.1% of the population, this over-
representation far exceeds that suffered by most minority groups. Such an outcome is set 
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against a backdrop of sustained hostility towards asylum seekers in the UK throughout 
large sections of the popular tabloid press: ‘The asylum shambles is the sea in which 
terror most easily swims’, the Daily Mail attests6. Such sentiments are in keeping with a 
long line of criticisms levied at the printed media by scholars working in the field of 
forced migration7. The national newspaper press, for example, have been argued to 
conflate the various types of illegality and migration8, overlook the link between 
international violence, civil wars and asylum seeking9, and disseminate inaccurate 
impressions of the level of welfare benefits accruing to asylum seekers as well as their 
preferential access to employment and housing markets10. Following a number of authors 
who are critical of the language used to construct the asylum issue in the UK11 Coole 
(2002) argues that these deficiencies relate to a broader linguistic framework utilised in 
the popular press that emphasises the illegal, untrustworthy nature of asylum seekers on 
the one hand, and their copious numbers on the other12. In a survey of Scottish 
newspapers, Mollard (2001) finds that over twice as many articles depict asylum seekers 
using words with negative connotations, such as ‘scroungers’, ‘floodgates’ and ‘bogus’, 
than with positive language13. What is more, negative depictions appear to have a 
significant effect: a MORI poll carried out in 2000 revealed that the average estimated 
level of asylum seeker benefits in the UK was £113 per week, far in excess of the £36.54 
per week level at the time of the poll14. Similarly, a 2002 newspaper poll recorded that 
the average estimated share of worldwide asylum seekers coming to the UK was 23%, 
more than ten times the actual share at the time15. 
 
One of the striking features about the association between terrorism and asylum seekers 
in the UK is its counter-intuitiveness. As Frank Furedi (2002) points out, suspicion about 
a large number of purported risks and safety concerns in modern society persist despite 
good reasons to be sceptical about their accuracy, and fear of asylum seekers in no 
exception16. Between 1999 and 2006, the number of principle asylum claims received by 
the UK plummeted from 71 000 to 23 500, representing a 67% reduction17. In 2001, as 
concern over international terrorism mounted, these figures compared to 23 million 
tourists, business people and students who stayed in the UK and a total of 88 million who 
passed through the UK’s borders during that year, dwarfing the number of asylum 
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applications received18. The association between asylum seekers and threats to national 
security is therefore questionable in the light of the comparatively small magnitude of 
asylum migration flows19. What is more, it is reasonable to assume that claiming asylum 
is an increasingly unattractive route into a country from a terrorist’s perspective. Asylum 
seekers regularly come into close contact with authorities not only at border control 
points but also before and after they have passed through the border. If they elicit the 
suspicion of border control officers asylum seekers can be immediately detained, without 
charge or release date, subject to the discretion of unelected, civil immigration 
personnel20. Furthermore, their freedom of movement within the UK is becoming 
increasingly constrained. Their accommodation has been contingent upon their residence 
in a particular area since 2000, they often have to check in at local police stations on a 
regular basis, and adult asylum seekers who cannot show that they have experienced 
torture have been subject to electronic tagging since 2006. For these reasons, any 
seriously minded terrorist is unlikely to choose asylum seeking as a way to access the UK 
if there are alternative routes available. 
 
Another striking feature about the fear of terrorism is its ability to serve as a basis for 
actions that actually contribute towards the threat of aggression itself. Along with a 
number of other authors, Didier Bigo has recently begun to theorise the links between 
fear, suspicion and unease on the one hand and institutionalised practices of security in 
the context of the war on terror on the other21. Through an examination of societal unease 
about security, Bigo suggests that states can be active in actually producing and 
sustaining discourses of fear and anxiety through the very security policies and 
procedures that they enact. For Bigo, by utilising a range of bio-political techniques 
spanning geo-surveillance, risk management and the employment of specific, subjective 
discourses pertaining to security, the subjects and spaces of security are continually 
disseminated and ratified by the state in the name of national security itself22. 
 
In the context of minority populations in the UK, we can clearly see the negative effects 
of the intrusive, biopolitical attempts to identify security threats, such as stop and search 
procedures, when we consider the responses of those communities that experience these 
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attempts first-hand. Marginalisation and alienation can result from the perceived 
imperative to identify security concerns, and the spectre of ‘radicalisation’ can justify 
practices that provoke precisely the sort of anti-authoritarianism they are designed to 
contain23. By worrying, wondering and agonising about security, aggression and hostility 
can actually be produced: precisely through the practices that ‘suspects’ have to undergo. 
In the context of security threats and concerns, it appears that searching for something 
long enough and hard enough can, given the correct conditions, create that which is 
sought, just as Bigo24 suggests. 
 
This chapter considers a case study that sheds some light upon this self-fulfilling, circular 
property of security practices. Taking the example of Lunar House in Croydon, the 
headquarters of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate as a case study, the chapter 
begins by examining the effects of the negative newspaper coverage that surrounds the 
site. In line with a long tradition of media speculation, criticism and scrutiny pertaining to 
Lunar House a number of high profile media scandals occurred during the period of my 
research at the site between September 2005 and June 2006. Firstly, a senior asylum 
caseworker was discovered to be abusing his position by offering visas in exchange for 
sexual favours in January 200625. Following this, a cleaning firm that was contracted to 
clean the building was found to be employing asylum seekers illegally, causing national 
consternation in the printed press26. As these scandals played out in 2006 Lunar House 
featured in a printed newspaper story on average once every four days, including three 
stories in The Mirror, five in The Telegraph, eight in The Observer, eleven in The Mail 
and twelve in The Times. Security staff, interviewers, caseworkers and managers were 
each profoundly affected by the demands to which they became subject as a result of 
these stories. The chapter examines the pressures that such media scrutiny creates among 
these employees and suggests that the printed media acts as a key driver of anxiety, fear 
and suspicion of asylum seekers among the workforce. 
 
The chapter goes on to outline the ways in which this atmosphere of heightened anxiety 
about security at Lunar House impacts upon the work that is carried out there. Following 
Stuart Hall et al’s (1978)27 seminal research into the way in which media anxiety can 
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prompt state institutions into over-reacting about particular social ‘crises’, thereby 
exacerbating the difficulties that are faced, it is argued that the security practices that are 
executed on the basis of media concerns actually produce conditions and procedures that 
can be degrading, inappropriate and, ultimately, provocative. Security measures at Lunar 
House can consequently elicit the very antipathy, despondency and hostility that they are 
intended to contain. This point is especially apparent with respect to the spatial layout of 
the building, which serves both as a security device, and as a provocation. It is argued 
that it is through the treatment of asylum seekers as a security threat that they can become 
humiliated, alienated and frustrated. We can, therefore, identify the same self-fulfilling 
and self-actualising nature of fear about security at Lunar House that appears to operate 
through the relationship between minority communities and stop and search procedures 
in the UK. It begins in the printed media, translates into uncompromising security 
procedures and elicits responses from the asylum seekers who use the building in their 
turn. This is one example of the ‘discourse of unease’ suggested by Bigo (2002) which 
produces that which it describes, typifying the contradictory and uncomfortable position 
that modern states occupy between real and imagined threats to national security. 
 
In the next section, the experience of visiting Lunar House is characterised, with 
particular emphasis on the queuing procedure for which the site has gained notoriety. In 
the third section, the extraordinary sway that the fear of negative media publicity holds 
over managers, as well as front-line public servants at Lunar House is examined through 
a consideration of the experiences of South London Citizens28, a local charity which used 
the threat of negative media publicity to secure access to carry out an influential analysis 
of the practices that take place at the site. In the fourth section, the security-justified 
processes and procedures that are undertaken as a result of the constant threat of negative 
media publicity are outlined and the provocative character of these policies and 
procedures are examined. 
 
Experiencing Lunar House: Queues 
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Lunar House is an imposing, 20-storey office block in the centre of Croydon, a bustling 
London suburb. Together with Apollo House, a neighbouring tower, it housed in 2005 the 
Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) of the Home Office (see Figure One29)30. 
 6
 Figure One: Lunar House 
The names of the two towers reference the heady optimism of the ‘space age’, and their 
grey, austere concrete bulks reflect the architectural style of the late 1960s31. Many 
asylum seekers make their initial claims for asylum in the offices of Lunar House, 
meaning that this is often the site at which the government first encounters asylum 
seekers, and asylum seekers first encounter the state. While significant numbers of 
asylum seekers apply for asylum at air- and sea-ports around the UK, the majority apply 
for asylum from within the country. In 2006, for example, 3,580 asylum applications 
were received at ports compared with 20,030 received in-country32. There are only two 
locations in the UK where asylum seekers can make within-country claims for asylum: at 
the Asylum Screening Units in Liverpool and Lunar House. While it is not possible to 
provide an accurate estimate of the number of asylum applications processed at Lunar 
House in particular (despite a number of parliamentary questions relating to this issue, it 
is felt that such information could only be collected at ‘disproportionate cost’33) around 
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two thousand IND employees worked here in 2005, with another four thousand working 
elsewhere in the Croydon area34. 
 
The administrative system at Lunar House struggles to accommodate the number of 
asylum seekers who apply. The facility has become notorious for the lines of bedraggled 
asylum seekers who cluster outside the gates, a notoriety that owes itself not only to the 
fact that the constant stream of asylum seekers into the UK is so clearly in evidence here, 
but also to the fact that Lunar House appears besieged, incapable of reducing the number 
of people waiting outside. Queues begin to form as early as 5am every day and are 
divided into two sections. On one side of the building a huge, purpose-built warehouse 
holds the queue of people routinely renewing visas or passports. This queue often reaches 
five hours in length. On the other side of the building, hidden from view behind the 
concrete bulk of the main office, asylum seekers queue separately in semi-covered areas, 
often for even longer. Doors close at 4pm on weekdays, but there are accounts of asylum 
seekers still being seen at 9pm and immigration officials themselves being asked to work 
until midnight in order to clear the backlog35. 
 
The aim of my research at Lunar House was to examine not the ways in which asylum 
seekers themselves experience unequal relations of power of various kinds (although they 
clearly do), but the ways in which the workforce, including security guards, asylum 
caseworkers, interviewers, backroom government employees and immigration system 
managers are induced to exert power over asylum seekers in ways that lead to their 
exclusion from national territory36. The focus was, therefore, on the employees who 
conduct and implement control of the UK’s borders, rather then those who experience 
this control. As such, attention is given to the pressures and influences that these actors 
are under in order to assess the ways in which they manage unease about ‘security’. 
 
In total, thirty-seven interviews were conducted between July 2005 and June 2006 as part 
of an examination of the security-justified treatment of asylum seekers across the UK, 
alongside participant observation of two high profile asylum advocacy campaigns and 
detailed textual analysis of promotional materials, policy documents and media coverage. 
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My interviews at Lunar House were conducted with national, management level 
professionals at the IND, union members working at Lunar House, campaigners working 
to improve the conditions within Lunar House, and users. They were complemented by 
drawing upon evidence contained within a comprehensive study of the experience of both 
staff and users, published in 2006 by South London Citizens (SLC), an independent local 
charity. This charity surveyed over 300 staff and users of Lunar House, and received 
thirty written submissions to their report37. 
 
The findings of the SLC enquiry highlighted the difficult conditions faced by asylum 
seekers while they wait. It recorded cold and draughty waiting rooms, a lack of available 
information (for example on queuing times or immigration procedures), poor provision 
for families, a lack of available refreshment, poor and inadequate toilet facilities, an 
incomprehensible complaints process and unsatisfactory fire safety and evacuation 
procedures38. Given these conditions, the length of queues has become a recurrent 
embarrassment. They have become both the symptom and expression of a bureaucratic 
system that is struggling to process the number of applicants it receives. 
 
It is clear from the sea of humanity that descends on Croydon each day that even 
20 storeys of bureaucrats cannot cope with the workload. 
 
The Observer, 2nd March 200339 
 
What is more, given the purported association between security and asylum seekers, the 
queues represent an unwelcome perceived security risk to the management team. When I 
interviewed a senior manager at Lunar House, these concerns were explicit40. 
 
From our point of view, we’ve got a lot of cost constraints so we don’t want to 




Despite government attempts to reduce the queues, waiting times have been persistently 
lengthy. In 2004, in response to media scrutiny, the layout of the building and the route of 
the queues were altered in order to promote a faster throughput of asylum seekers and 
reduce the numbers who were waiting. Interviewers were also given more time away 
from their desks for breaks, in the hope that they would be able to provide a more 
‘efficient’ service. In an interview in June 2005, however, the then Minister for 
Immigration was forced to concede that the ‘pig pen’-style queues were still there and 
that the measures designed to ameliorate the long waiting times had not been sufficient41. 
 
By the time an asylum seeker reaches the head of the queue at Lunar House they may be 
tired, irritable and frustrated at the treatment they have received, especially if they are 
under the age of eighteen or traumatised by their experiences in their countries of origin. 
What awaits them is a difficult interview in which they must give their case for asylum. 
These testimonies are recorded and will be used as evidence for the determination of their 
claim, both at appeal and in the event that the asylum seeker be deported. Around 15% of 
asylum cases are not adjudicated correctly at the first sitting in the UK (and this figure 
assumes that the second sitting detects all mis-adjudicated cases)42. What is more, should 
an asylum seeker raise the suspicion of caseworkers sufficiently, there are facilities to 
incarcerate them at Lunar House pending immediate deportation43. 
 
Fear of the Printed Press 
 
Both the queuing process and the eventual asylum interview can, therefore, be fraught, 
stressful events. Under such conditions, the threat of negative media attention can have 
powerful effects and can raise levels of anxiety among the management staff as well as 
among front line employees, such as security guards, interviewers and caseworkers. For 
example, the legacy of the negative press coverage concerning the offering of visas in 
exchange for sexual favours and the contracting of illegally employed asylum seekers 
was to raise anxiety among the management team about the flows of information within 
Lunar House. A new ‘director of communications’ was employed, a post that had 
previously not existed, reflecting the level of concern and exacerbating the tense working 
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conditions of existing staff. The SLC report also found evidence of the impact of media 
scrutiny over employees: 
 
Staff are under so much pressure – not just the targets, but keeping on top of the 
pressure that’s put on them. They’re at the front line of national concern and 
they have to deal with the psychic [sic] burden. 
Personal Testimony, Back, Farrell et al. 2005, p63 
 
Such concerns indicate the seriousness with which national newspaper coverage is taken 
at Lunar House. 
 
To illustrate the importance of concerns about negative publicity to the way Lunar House 
operates, the means by which SLC gained access to Lunar House is instructive. The 
charity was able to harness the threat of negative media attention at Lunar House and 
turn it to their advantage, demonstrating the effect it can have. SLC is a largely voluntary 
organisation, composed of a diverse collection of churches, unions, schools and other 
civic organisations. The charity aims to improve the lives of marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups in the South London area. Although Croydon is part of its 
geographical remit, however, it set itself a difficult task from the outset with respect to 
Lunar House, by making it the explicit intention of the charity to expose the 
dehumanising practices that many asylum seekers experience there. There is no reason to 
expect that the Lunar House management team, which was also the national-level 
executive managing committee of the IND at the time of SLC’s enquiry, would be 
responsive or receptive to these aspirations. 
 
By using media coverage, however, and the threat of media coverage, SLC was able not 
only to access Lunar House, but also to negotiate the co-operation of the senior 
management team, to use substantial levels of IND financial resources to meet their 
objectives, in the form of a management-level IND employee who was appointed to work 
two days a week in order to carry out SLC’s recommendations, and to alter a range of 
dehumanising practices at Lunar House, including removal of some of the ‘pig pen’ style 
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railings, removal of the prohibition of mobile phone use within the building, the 
introduction of a customer service booth and the re-organisation of interview rooms to 
ensure greater privacy. 
 
Initially, the relationship between the management team and SLC was nevertheless 
hostile. SLC chose to distribute tea and coffee from a brightly coloured Winnebago to the 
asylum seekers who were queuing outside Lunar House on a cold morning. This activity 
attracted media coverage and served to announce the intentions of the SLC group in loud 
and obvious terms, with predictably negative reactions from the Lunar House 
management team. Under constant (now-credible) threat of further publicity, however, 
the co-operation of the management team was gradually secured. Although the 
management team would routinely postpone meetings, withhold information, miss 
deadlines, attempt to cancel appointments and leave very long amounts of time between 
correspondence, SLC repeatedly made use of the threat of staging another eye-catching 
public action, such as a parade or distributing more tea and coffee at the front of Lunar 
House. As one SLC organiser44, reflecting upon the process of securing the co-operation 
of the senior IND management team, explains: 
 
[After the initial distribution of tea and coffee] they were taking us very 
seriously because they saw what we’d done, we’d got quite a bit of media 
attention. When we heard from [senior immigration officials] ‘yes, we’ll 
come to discuss working together on the basis that there is no media’ we 
said ‘ok, we agree’. And when they hadn’t sent us their response … we 
decided that we would stage an action, if only to galvanise the support of the 
voluntary sector. But having let them know, we then got an immediate 
response back. 
 
The relationship between SLC and the management team in Lunar House was therefore 
constructed and sustained precisely through the threat of staging eye-catching, media-
attracting ‘actions’. This threat unpinned the success of SLC in achieving their stated 
objectives. Although there are, doubtless, questions about the extent to which SLC have 
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made a genuine difference at Lunar House45, the fact that they were successful at 
securing the co-operation of the management team points towards the sensitivity of the 
IND, and the government more generally, to the threat of negative publicity and 
underscores the pervasive fear of media coverage that runs throughout the organisation. 
This sensitivity demonstrates the influence the media can exert through the mechanism of 
framing - selectively representing certain perceived aspects of reality so as to promote 
particular definitions, interpretations, evaluations and treatments46. By harnessing the 
fear of the media’s influence that pervades Lunar House, as well as the sensationalism 
that the printed press can generate47, the management team became remarkably 
accommodating of SLC’s demands. 
 
Circulating Security Concerns 
 
Because there is an association between asylum seekers and terrorism in the printed 
press, and because the printed press has such a strong influence within Lunar House, as 
the experience of the SLC team demonstrates, it is no surprise that security at Lunar 
House is extremely tight. The exterior of the building is patrolled by uniformed security 
guards. Their job is to police the queues and to crack down on ‘asylum agents’ who offer 
illegal employment to the many recently-arrived asylum seekers in the vicinity. All 
entrants to the building are searched and must remove watches, keys and jewellery in 
order to pass through airport-style metal detectors upon entering. Entrants’ bags are 
searched and cameras, mobile phones and other electronic equipment are confiscated and 
stored in locked cabinets at the gates. Only asylum seekers and migrants wanting to 
renew visas are allowed past the first desk and asylum seekers cannot be accompanied 
unless they are under eighteen years of age or have documentary evidence to show that 
they are vulnerable. Security of staff is also taken extremely seriously. When I 
interviewed members of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate’s senior 
management team, I was accompanied at all times: first by a security guard in the foyer, 




Three specific security procedures appeared to have a significant impact upon the way 
Lunar House was experienced by my interveiwees. Firstly, the chairs that are provided at 
interview are bolted to the floor so as to prevent them from being used as weapons or 
projectiles, and no chairs were provided during large parts of the queuing process. 
Secondly, interviewers are located behind protective plastic screens in order to shield 
them from personal attack. Thirdly, the entire senior management team is located not in 
the main offices of Lunar House, but in a separate office five minutes walk away, so as to 
reduce the security risk to the building as well as to the team. These security measures 
have implications for the management, users and workforce at Lunar House. 
One way in which security policies can inconvenience workers at Lunar House, for 
example, relates to the experience of senior management. Their physical separation from 
the main Lunar House building has distinct disadvantages. The SLC report highlighted 
the difficult position of the senior management team in communicating effectively with 
front-line staff. Contributors to the report raised concerns that senior management did not 
understand the needs of front-line staff, or welcome their ideas. With these sorts of 
perceptions, clear leadership and visible support of caseworkers and interviewers in the 
main building had become a high priority for the senior management team. The physical 
distancing between senior management and workers, however, did nothing to meet these 
objectives. As one of my interviewees outlined48, it was more difficult for managers to 
keep track of the day to day running of the building, including the working atmosphere 
and the opinions of middle managers, when they were physically separated from it. It was 
also more difficult for managers to show clear, visible and immediate leadership in the 
event of disturbances. In a 2004 survey of staff attitudes49 the Home Office found that 
only 13% of the workforce thought that the IND senior management team was in touch 
with staff. The separation of senior management from staff can only exacerbate these 
difficulties. 
Another effect of these security measures was to provoke the users of Lunar House. One 
of my interviewees50 had accompanied a number of vulnerable asylum seekers to Lunar 
House. His frustration at the way in which asylum seekers were expected to endure the 
queuing conditions was evident. 
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I think it’s deliberately making it so difficult that fewer and fewer people will 
even embark on this process. The whole system is wanting to send a message to 
the countries of origin ‘Britain doesn’t want you.  We will make it really tough.  
Don’t come here ‘cos we do everything we possibly can to push you back’. It’s 
deliberately so that you know that this is going to be really, really tough. 
 
The lack of seating during the waiting period meant that the conditions of queuing 
became even more arduous. Another one of my interviewees51 gave the following 
account. 
 
You had to stand, you weren’t allowed to sit in that queue. There were old 
people, children, all sorts of people, people who had literally just come off the 
plane, or had come off the back of a lorry: had to stand.  There was this pregnant 
woman next to me, I think she was an African woman, who was I think leaning 
against something and [an official] came out and he just abused her and told her 
that she wasn’t allowed to lean. It was dreadful. There were pregnant women 
being herded and being forced to stand around in a way that it’s not right for 
people when they’re old and carrying children to be forced to stand in queues, to 
be treated as though they have no rights at all. 
 
When applicants reached the head of the queue, the fact that chairs were bolted to the 
floor during the interview procedure, and that interviewers were protected by a plastic 
screen, also served to aggravate the asylum seekers who were being interviewed. Fixed 
seats meant that many of them had to lean a long distance forward in order to make their 
cases for asylum. In this way, the internal layout of the interview room served as a 
provocation. The protective plastic screen, for example, meant that asylum seekers had to 
recount their experiences, often involving intimate or disturbing details, in a loud voice 
in a public room. 
 
When security practices and procedures are themselves provocative a degree of 
escalation can set in, giving rise to what Furedi (2002) refers to as a ‘culture of fear’52. 
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The fact that chairs were fastened into position, and that a protective plastic screen was 
seen as a necessary measure to protect interviewers, was taken to constitute a strong 
statement about applicants’ characters, leading to resentment and hostility among the 
users of Lunar House.  
 
[Security policies] create a culture of suspicion which makes asylum seekers feel 
hostile because they are being treated as though they are not good people53. 
 
For this reason, one interviewee saw a direct link between the security measures taken 
and the risk of security incidents themselves54. He suggested that the protective screen 
was capable of precipitating aggression among asylum seekers who had been waiting all 
day to be interviewed. 
 
If you’re a member of staff and you’ve had five people have a go at you in one 
morning and really get aggressive, you need that screen. But why did those 
people get aggressive in the first place? Because the screen was there! They 
couldn’t speak properly! The seats are so far away their personal business 
everybody can hear! 
 
A third effect of the security justified polices and procedures in operation at Lunar House 
concerns their influence over the front-line workforce in the building, including 
interviewers, security guards and caseworkers. Security procedures can influence these 
workers both directly and indirectly, either through their immediate effects upon the 
workforce or through the reactions that they engender within the asylum seeking 
population, which impact, in turn, upon the workforce. 
 
Directly, there is evidence that employees are not generally happy in their jobs: 50% of 
IND workers left within the first two years between 2003 and 200555. While there is 
some evidence that this might be the result of a stressful working environment (one third 
of Home Office employees say that they experience stress ‘often’, ‘very often’ or 
‘always’ in comparison to under 14% in the UK economy as a whole56), the SLC report 
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also noted that the imperative to enact security procedures can be a source of regret and 
anxiety to staff.  
 
I feel anxious, frustrated and demotivated … I am disappointed in myself 
because I end up acting in an uncaring, unsupportive way when dealing with 
customers. 
 
Staff Testimony, Back, Farrell et al. 2005, p6357 
 
One of my interviewees58 detailed the case of a security guard she had met whilst 
queuing. The security guard had explained that the way he was treating asylum seekers at 
Lunar House was a source of shame and disappointment to him. These sentiments were 
so extreme that he was planning to resign from his post the following week in order to 
pursue work elsewhere. Such introspection hints at the need for a sophisticated 
understanding of security professionals as individuals who can experience security 
policies as a constraint or imposition in difficult circumstances. 
 
Indirectly, interviewers can also feel intimidated by the aggression and hostility that 
security policies can provoke in their interviewees. Another of my research participants59 
had accompanied a vulnerable asylum seeker to her interview and, after waiting with her 
for seven hours in uncomfortable queuing conditions, had taken a confrontational 
approach to the interview and attempted to use the threat of newspaper coverage to secure 
the co-operation of the interviewer. In response to this approach, the interviewer had 
obfuscated important information from my research participant, refused to divulge details 
of the claimant’s case or engage in any discussion of the legal situation of the claimant. 
The interviewer also refused to accept new information about the claimant’s case, 
concealed her own identity badge from both the claimant and my research participant, 




Aside from confirming the pervasive power of the fear of the printed media within Lunar 
House, these actions indicate a degree of anxiety on the part of the interviewer. Faced 
with the frustration and hostility of my research participant, the interviewer had become 
intimidated and refused to co-operate with the interviewee. In other words, the 
provocation of the interviewee negatively impacted upon the interviewer herself, 
producing anxiety about the repercussions of the encounter and a readiness to contravene 
protocol by withholding information such as her identity. In such ways, security policies 
at Lunar House can negatively impact upon workers through the provocation of its users. 
These patterns of heightening anxiety, suspicion and hostility capture the circular, 




The case of Lunar House is illustrative of a range of negative ramifications of the war on 
terror. Firstly, as Bigo (2002)61 has discussed, it is clear from the sensitivity of the 
management team at Lunar House to media scrutiny that the fear of being accused of lax 
security procedures, “unease about security” in Bigo’s terms, is at least as powerful as 
real security concerns themselves in determining policies and procedures at Lunar House. 
As a result, employees from the managerial staff down to front-line public servants are 
subject to the often imagined, volatile and exaggerated demands and scrutiny of the 
printed press. Workers can consequently feel that they must conduct themselves in ways 
that appear concordant with the imperative to maintain security, which can be detrimental 
to their own working environments, the work that they carry out, and the asylum seekers 
who rely upon their services. 
 
Secondly, by implementing policies that are at once preventative and provocative, the 
security practices at Lunar House illustrate a particular paradox of concern about 
security: the self-fulfilling and self-actualising quality of security unease. By 
implementing procedures that treat individuals as potential security threats, such 
procedures invite hostility and can create precisely the sorts of reactions they are intended 
to contain. In these ways, security procedures can undermine security itself by alienating 
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or humiliating those who are subject to them. This effect remains the case regardless of 
the degree to which actual, extant security threats exist. Indeed, this effect challenges any 
neat distinction between existing security threats and responses to these threats by 
highlighting the mutually re-enforcing relationship between them. 
 
The self-actualising quality of security concerns that is in evidence at Lunar House 
replays on a variety of scales and in a variety of contexts within the logics of the war on 
terror more broadly. While Lunar House illustrates the micro-level operation of this 
phenomenon, the alienation of communities is also possible as a result of the policy 
manifestations of security concerns, as the social ramifications of stop and search ethnic 
profiling illustrate. Moreover, at the international level, whole countries and cultures can 
react with suspicion, distrust and violence in response to perceived aggression that is 
predicated upon the search for terrorists and the eradication of security risks as the unrest 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate. In this light, the self-fulfilling potential of unease 
about security is a phenomenon that characterises, typifies and problematises the war on 
terror across a wide range of situations. 
 
Thirdly, however, despite this structural and conceptual flaw in the logic of the war on 
terror, the case of Lunar House also illustrates the circular, escalating quality of unease 
about security. One of the most worrying aspects of the self-actualising property of 
security concerns is the fact that, once responses are actualised and elicited from those 
who are treated/produced as suspects, these responses can then be taken as confirmatory 
evidence of the need for security measures in the first instance. This effect can complete 
the link between imagined security risks and heightened security procedures, introducing 
the possibility that unease about security progressively diverges from reality. Given the 
attention that the printed press pays to Lunar House, and the evident power that the media 
have in shaping the practices that are undertaken there, the potential for unease about 
security at Lunar House to escalate further in the future is clear. Moreover, in the light of 
this study, the extent to which the circular escalation of unease about security is 
reproduced in wider contexts, through the contested relationship between state agencies 
and media, merits ongoing attention. 
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